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CONGRESS IN THE WINGS:
THE CZECH CLAIMS NEGOTIATIONS, 1974-1981
HARRY MCPHERSON*
JOHN A. MERRIGAN**
Scholars and political commentators have long debated the proper
mix of executive and legislative authority in the conduct of foreign rela-
tions. During the past half-century, the prevailing view has been one of
skepticism toward congressional efforts in the field. From the neutrality
legislation of the 1930s to the attempts in the 1950s by Senator Joseph
McCarthy and others to limit President Eisenhower's discretion in deal-
ing with Communist countries, congressional intervention has been
criticized for its shortsightedness, its parochialism, its potentential for
embarrassing the United States, and for depriving it of the flexibility
needed for the effective assertion of American interests abroad.1
The Constitution gives Congress several specific roles that affect
foreign relations: to declare war, to regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions, to share in the treaty-making process.2 Each of these roles has the
potential for shaping, even rigidly shaping, America's relationship with
the world. The ordinary conduct of foreign affairs, however-the daily
business of dealing between governments-is commonly thought to be
an executive branch responsibility into which Congress intrudes at some
peril to the nation. The Supreme Court, in the 1936 Curtiss-Wright case,
stated the accepted proposition that the President acts as the primary
representative of the United States in foreign affairs:
In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated,
delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He
makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he
alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation, the Senate cannot
* Partner, Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard & McPherson, Washington, D.C.; A.B. 1949,
University of the South; LL.B. 1956, University of Texas.
** Partner, Verner, Liipfert, Berhard & McPherson, Washington, D.C.; A.B. 1970,
Georgetown University; J.D. 1973, Loyola University.
I Following the 1982 congressional elections, The Economist editorialized that "[i]t
will cause nothing but confusion abroad if the rest of the world feels that Mr. Reagan does
not speak for his government. Foreigners tend to prefer the single voice of even an imperial
presidency to the cacophony of the coequal branch of government." Ouch, he explained, THE
ECONOMIST, Nov. 6, 1982, at 13. See also, Tower, Congress Versus the President: The For-
mulation and Implementation of American Foreign Policy, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 229 (Winter
1981182).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (regulation of commerce); id. § 8, cl. 11 (declare war); id.
§ 2, cl. 1 (treaty-making).
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intrude; the Congress itself is powerless to invade it. As Mar-
shall said in his great argument of March 7, 1800 .... "The Presi-
dent is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and
its sole representative with foreign nations.
3
Dispositive as such a statement seems, it could not realistically be
read to deny Congress any legitimate say in defining the purposes for
which the President negotiates with other powers. The Court's state-
ment is an assertion of Presidential primacy, not of complete autonomy.
Indeed the Curtiss-Wright Court acknowledged that the Constitution
does not divide authority in foreign matters unequivocally. Subsequent
Courts have confirmed that, when the President acts in the absence of a
congressional authorization he may enter "a zone of twilight in which he
and the Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain."4 American political history, from the
Federalist Papers forward, assumes a congressional-at least a
senatorial -voice in foreign affairs:
The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opin-
ion of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to com-
mit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those
which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the
sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would
be a President of the United States.'
In practical terms, what Curtiss-Wright was about, after its thumping
defense of the President's authority, was assuring him adequate running
room:
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our interna-
tional relations, embarrassment-perhaps serious embarrass-
ment-is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, con-
gressional legislation which is to be made effective through
negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often
accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from
statutory restriction which would not be admissible were
domestic affairs alone involved.'
Congress should not, in sum, so tie the Executive's hand that he cannot
respond to new international conditions, or so require him to serve
private interests that he must as a consequence ignore larger public
ones. Even in those areas in which congressional authority is explicit, as
in the regulation of foreign trade, some latitude must be afforded the na-
' United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
' Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981).
THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 223 (A. Hamilton) (R. Fairfield ed. 1981).
299 U.S. at 320.
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tion's principal dealmaker. He must remain free to seek the paramount
goal of national security even if doing so requires the sacrifice of
domestic economic interests.
The wide latitude granted the President in conducting international
policy is broadly accepted in theory. Yet it is often challenged by events,
and by strong tides of public opinion. America's involvement in the Viet-
nam War, legislatively based on commitments and authority in the
SEATO Treaty and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, generated, in its tragic
aftermath, a congressional insistence on controlling the commitment of
American forces abroad, even absent a formal declaration of war.7 Ap-
proval of the Panama Canal Treaty- an event of almost traumatic effect
on many Americans-occurred only after the Senate insisted upon
several amendments which for a time threatened its acceptance by
Panama. For three decades congressional support for Israel has decisively
affected American policy in the Middle East. A classic confrontation be-
tween executive and congressional imperatives in foreign policy occur-
red during the Kissinger era, when the Secretary of State's devotion to
Realpolitik' collided with Congress' determination to punish or ignore
nations whose human rights records were unacceptable. Kissinger's no-
tion of "discretion" for the executive, using Justice Sutherland's term in
Curtiss-Wright, was obviously very broad. For its part, Congress, in the
wake of Vietnam and disclosures of CIA involvement in several ques-
tionable activities, wanted to be in on more take-offs, on the assumption
that this would reduce the frequency of the crash landings.
Private persons -litigants, claimants, and others with commercial or
family interests abroad -sometimes find themselves in the middle of
such an executive-congressional tug-of-war. Indeed, they often cause it.
For example, they may produce pipeline equipment, and find themselves
stymied by Presidential sanctions against its shipment to the Soviet
Union. They therefore prevail on members of Congress (most recently,
on the leader of the President's own party in the House of Repre-
sentatives) to repeal the President's authority to impose the sanctions.
There they meet arguments much like those in Curtiss-Wright: it would
embarrass the United States by embarrassing the President if his
authority in such a crucial area were challenged. The fact that virtually
all of Europe united in opposition to President Reagan's pipeline sanc-
tions was irrelevant. The act of disabling the President in his capacity as
foreign policy executor must be avoided for the nation's sake.'
In 1981, the Supreme Court upheld President Carter's agreement to
terminate ongoing legal proceedings against Iran, to nullify at-
tachments, and to refer all claims to a special tribunal, in order to obtain
' Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia, 50 U.S.C. App.
1937 (1976).
H. KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS 57, 114 (1977).
128 CONG. REC. H7920-31 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1982).
1983]
424 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
the release of fifty-two American hostages. Congressional approval, ex-
press and implied, was one of the factors cited:
[W]here, as here, the settlement of claims has been a necessary
incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute be-
tween our country and another, and where, as here, we can con-
clude that Congress acquiesced in the President's action, we are
not prepared to say that the President lacks the power to settle
such claims."
The Court contrasted Congress' quiescence in the Iranian agreement
with its reaction to a 1973 executive agreement initialled with
Czechoslovakia which proposed to settle $105,000,000 in American
citizens' claims against Czechoslovakia for $20,500,000. Congress had
moved swiftly then to block the Czechoslovak agreement and to require
legislative approval of any future settlement of the claims. 1 It is this
Czechoslovak affair-so protracted, so faceted with international, finan-
cial, and human considerations, so frustrating, and ultimately so reward-
ing-that this article describes. The result, eight years after Congress
blocked the 1973 Agreement and after further congressional inter-
vention, was the most favorable of the post-war claim settlements. 2
10 453 U.S. at 688. The Court acknowledged that this was
[ojnly one more episode in the never-ending tension between the President exer-
cising the executive authority in a world that presents each day some new
challenge with which he must deal and the Constitution under which we all live
and which no one disputes embodies some sort of system of checks and balances.
Id. at 662. The Court analyzed President Carter's use of executive authority according to
Mr. Justice Jackson's guidelines in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
When the President acts pursuant to an express authorization from Congress, he
exercises not only his powers but those delegated by Congress. In such a case the
executive action "would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the
widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest
heavily upon any who might attack it." ... When the President acts in the absence
of congressional authorization he may enter "a zone of twilight in which he and
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain." . . . In such a case the analysis becomes more complicated, and the
validity of the President's action, at least so far as separation of power principles
are concerned, hinges on a consideration of all the circumstances that may shed
light on the views of the Legislative Branch toward such action, including "con-
gressional inertia, indifference or quiescence. Finally, when the President
acts in contravention of the will of Congress, "his power is at its lowest ebb," and
the Court can sustain his actions "only by disabling the Congress from acting
upon the subject."
453 U.S. at 668-69.
" 453 U.S. at 688 n.13.
12 Pechota, The 1981 U.S.-Czechoslovak Claims Settlement Agreement: An Epilogue
to Postwar Nationalization and Expropriation Disputes, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 639, 640 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as The 1981 U.S.-Czechoslovak Claims Settlement Agreement: An
Epilogue]. See also Johnson, Legislators as Diplomats: The Czechoslovak Gold Dispute, 9 J.
LEGis. 36 (Winter 1982).
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The authors of this article were counsel for a coalition of claimants
against Czechoslovakia and observed most of the denouement first-hand.
Our purpose in recounting the long struggle here, however, is to suggest
that the Czechoslovak negotiations hold certain useful lessons for the
future. The wary, but in the end symbiotic, cooperation between Con-
gress and the State Department that developed in the Czech claims case
may be appropriate for other controversies involving American in-
terests and intractable foreign governments.
There are two strands to the Czech affair. One involves the claims of
American citizens to compensation for the taking of their property. by
Czechoslovakia. The second involves gold, tons of it, in the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. It was, or was not, depending on one's point
of view, owned by Czechoslovakia and hence subject to seizure by the
United States as an asset of a nation which refused to pay for the con-
fiscation of American property.
I. THE CLAIMS
Post-war nationalization in Czechoslovakia occurred in two stages:
first, in 1945, when the socialist President Benes signed decrees to bring
about the nationalization of certain businesses; second, in and after 1948,
when the new Communist government completed the sweeping ex-
propriation of private property. Legislation enacted in the first phase
acknowledged the obligation to pay compensation for nationalized prop-
erty." The Communist government that took over in 1948, however,
regarded nationalization of private property as a sovereign right, and in-
sisted that state sovereignty encompassed the power to determine the
terms and conditions of compensation, if any, that the state would pro-
vide for foreign-owned property.4
Pursuant to the Agreement On Commercial Policy And Compensa-
tion Claims, which Secretary Acheson obtained from the Benes govern-
ment in 1946,11 the State Department began negotiations to obtain pay-
" See 15 DEP'T ST. BULL. Dec. 1, 1946, at 1003.
14 See Settlement of Claims Against Czechoslovakia: Hearing and Markup on H.R.
7338 Before the Subcomms. on Europe and the Middle East and on International Economic
Policy and Trade of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 116, 123
(1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 House Claims Hearing] (Statement of Edward L. Merrigan);
id. at 181, 187 (Legal Memorandum accompanying statement of Harry McPherson); Unpaid
Claims of U.S. Citizens Against Czechoslovakia: Hearing on S. 2721 Before the Subcomm.
on International Trade of the Senate Committee on Finance, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as 1980 Senate Claims Hearing] (Statement of Edward L. Merrigan); id. at
43 (Legal Appendix to the Statement by Harry McPherson); The 1981 U.S.-Czechoslovak
Claims Settlement Agreement. An Epilogue, supra note 12, at 641-42.
"5 Commercial Relations-Exchange of Notes, November 4, 1946, United States-
Czechosolvakia, 61 Stat. 2431, T.I.A.S. No. 1569, 7 U.N.T.S. 119. The Agreement provided
for "adequate and effective compensation" to nationals of either country with respect to
their rights or interest in properties nationalized by the other country.
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ment for the Americans whose properties Czechoslovakia had seized. In
1949 and again in 1955, no final settlement resulted from negotiations. In
1958 the Eisenhower Administration recommended-and Congress en-
acted-an amendment to the International Claims Settlement Act of
1949.16 In addition to authorizing the determination of American claims
against Czechoslovakia, the law provided that if, within one year after
enactment, the United States and Czechoslovakia failed to enter a settle-
ment agreement, the United States would use the proceeds from the sale
of certain steel mill equipment purchased by Czechoslovakia in the
United States in 1947, which was never delivered, to make pro rata
payments to United States citizens holding awards from the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) against Czechoslovakia. Still no
settlement was obtained.
American citizens submitted claims to the FCSC for $364,000,000.
The FCSC completed its award determinations by 1962, reducing the
size of many of the awards -in large part because of the difficulty of prov-
ing the value of properties seized ten years earlier in an uncooperative
foreign country. Each award included principal plus interest at a rate of
six percent through 1958: in all, the awards totalled about $113,000,000.
Because the United States and Czechoslovakia failed to reach a settle-
ment, the United States Treasury distributed $8,540,768 from the sale of
the Czech steel mill equipment, leaving an unpaid balance of
$105,104,437 to approximately 2,600 awardholders."7
In 1963, around the time when the United States concluded post-war
settlement agreements with Bulgaria, Poland, Rumania, and Yugo-
slavia, 8 the Department of State again attempted to reach an agreement
with Czechoslovakia settling the balance of the United States claims. No
agreement was implemented, in large part because Congress considered
the proposed compensation of $2,000,000 inadequate. 9 For the next ten
years, no serious effort at a settlement occurred. Then, in 1973, at the
height of the detente period and as Congress considered legislation of-
fering substantial trade credits to Eastern European nations, the
Czechoslovak Government and the Nixon Administration resumed settle-
ment negotiations. Those negotiations resulted in the initialling of an
agreement on July 5, 1974 which provided:
, Title IV of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. § 1642 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
17 Fcsc DEC. & ANN. 379 (1968).
,S The United States concluded claims settlement agreements with Rumania and
Poland in 1960, 11 U.S.T. 317, 1953; with Bulgaria in 1963, 14 U.S.T. 969; and with
Yugoslavia in 1965, 16 U.S.T. 1. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680 n.9 (1981).
"S See Final Negotiations and Settlement of Claims Against Czechoslovakia: Hearings
and Markup on H.R. 2631 and H.R. 5125 Before the Subcomms. on Europe and the Middle
East and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Af-
fairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, 19 [hereinafter cited as 1981 House Claims Hearings] (state-
ment of Rozanne L. Ridgway, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Department of
State); see also 1980 Senate Claims Hearing, supra note 14, at 17.
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1. That the Czechoslovak Government's $105,000,000 debt
to United States citizens, and the full amount of any unad-
judicated claims, would be settled fully and finally for the pay-
ment of $20,500,000, payable, without interest, over a twelve-
year period. 0
2. That the United States immediately would release its
blocking controls over all Czechoslovak properties, rights or in-
terests in the United States.
2
1
3. That the United States would inform the Tripartite Com-
mission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold of its agreement to
release to the Czechoslovak Government 18,400 kilograms of
gold."
Apparently the parties also contemplated that, upon passage of the
Trade Act of 1974,1 Czechoslovakia would be eligible for most favored
nation treatment in the United States tariff laws.
Because the initialled agreement between the United States and
Czechoslovakia required formal ratification by both governments, Con-
gress had an opportunity to examine it. After hearings,24 Congress
vetoed the agreement as being totally inadequate to compensate award-
holders after a quarter of a century of delay. Instead, Congress demanded
in the Trade Act of 1974 that (a) the July 5, 1974 agreement between the
United States and Czechoslovakia be renegotiated and the new agree-
ment submitted to Congress; and (b) the United States not release any
gold belonging to Czechoslovakia located in the United States until Con-
gress approved the claims settlement agreement.? The Senate Finance
Committee explained that the initial agreement was unacceptable
because the United States, by entering such a one-sided agreement with
Czechoslovakia, effectively would endorse expropriations of United
States properties by other countries without the payment of adequate
compensation.28
A six-year impasse followed. The Czechoslovak Government
resented Congress's rejection of the agreement it had initialled with the
State Department, and the State Department understood that it would
be futile to ask Congress to approve an unremunerative agreement.
Meanwhile, the reference in the initialled agreement to the United
States Government's consent to the return of 1,840 kilograms of gold to
Agreement Between the United States and Czechoslovakia on the Settlement of
Certain Outstanding Claims and Financial Issues, July 5, 1974, art. 1, 3 (unpublished).
21 Id. art. 10.
Id. art. 7.
19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
24 Czechosolvakia Claims Settlement. Executive Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Senate Hearings].
19 U.S.C. § 2438 (1976).
S. REP. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7168, 7348.
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Czechoslovakia alerted Congress, and the United States claimants, to
the existence of a collateral fund within the United States of which they
previously had been unaware. The State Department seemed similarly
uninformed. During congressional hearings in 1974, State Department
officials could not answer Senators' inquiries about where the gold was
located."
The withholding of most favored nation status from Czechoslovakia
did not prove to be an effective sanction, particularly as relations be-
tween the United States and Czechoslovakia soured during the later
1970s. However, as gold prices soared, the hoard located in the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York provided new leverage which Congress
ultimately used to provoke a settlement.
II. THE GOLD
The United States custody of the gold proved to be the key element
in the final round of negotiation. Czechoslovakia had obtained title to the
gold as the result of a post-World War II arrangement to reimbuse na-
tions which had been plundered by Germany. During the second World
War, the Nazis stole huge amounts of gold from various countries, much
of which was recovered by American or other allied armies in 1945. The
United States adopted a policy of refusing to recognize the legality of
Germany's acquisition of this gold. The United States advocated that the
gold should not be claimed as war booty, but that it should be
distributed pro rata among claimant countries as restitution for their
established losses of monetary gold.28
On January 14, 1946, eighteen interested countries, including the
United States, Great Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia, signed the
Paris Reparations Agreement of 1946,29 which provided that all
monetary gold stolen by Germany should be pooled for restitution
among the countries from which it had been stolen." The Agreement
directed countries participating in the pool to submit claims to the
United States, Great Britain, and France, as the occupying powers."
After the adjudication of competing claims, the agreement directed the
United States, Great Britain, and France to "take appropriate steps
within the zones of Germany occupied by them respectively to imple-
ment distribution" to the countries entitled to restitution of stolen
gold." To carry out that function, the United States, Great Britain, and
' 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 8, 23.
' See 1980 House Claims Hearing, supra note 14, at 29 (Legal Opinion of Department
of State and Department of Treasury).
' Agreement Between the United States of America and Other Governments, Jan. 14,
1946, 61 Stat. 3157, T.I.A.S. No. 1655.
Id. Part II, art. A.
31 Id. Part III, art. E.
Id. Part III. art. F.
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France signed the Tripartite Commission Arrangement on September
27, 1946, establishing the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of
Monetary Gold.'
The Commission awarded Czechoslovakia title to approximately 24
metric tons of gold. France delivered six tons of gold to Czechoslovakia,
but in 1948 President Truman responded to the uncompensated
Czechoslovak expropriations of American properties by blocking all
Czech assets in the United States, including approximately 8.2 metric
tons of gold located in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Britain,
which itself had unresolved disputes with Czechoslovakia, similarly
froze another 10.5 metric tons of Czech gold in the Bank of London.
Section 408 of the Trade Act of 1974 specifically prohibited the
release of any gold belonging to Czechoslovakia and controlled by the
United States until such time as Congress might approve a claims settle-
ment agreement.Y During the 1974 hearings, members of the Senate
Finance Committee, including Chairman Russell Long, asserted that the
United States should confiscate, sell, and distribute the gold, as had been
done with the Czech steel mill equipment, to satisfy the outstanding
United States claims.5 Without support of a legal memorandum, the
State Department advised the Finance Committee that confiscation of
the Czech gold was distinguishable from confiscation of the Czech steel
mill equipment, in that the United States had a custodial obligation
under the Paris Reparations Agreement which rendered the confiscation
of the Czech gold unlawful. 6
In 1980, confronted with a continuing stalemate, Senator Daniel
Patrick Moynihan and Representative Lester Wolff introduced legisla-
tion that seemed consistent at once with Congress' predisposition
toward a negotiated settlement, the custodial duties of the United
States, and the objective of making prompt compensation to the aging
United States awardholders.3 7 The legislation would have provided a
final deadline for the Department of State to negotiate an acceptable
settlement with the Czech Government. Absent such a timely settle-
ment, the legislation directed the Secretary of the Treasury (1) to liquidate
Czechoslovak assets blocked within the United States, including the
Czech gold held in the Federal Reserve Bank in New York; (2) to invest
the proceeds from the assets' liquidation, and to use the earnings from
the investment to satisfy the American awards; and (3) to return the
principal proceeds in full to Czechoslovakia, once all American awards
had been satisfied.
3 15 DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 29, 1946, at 563.
- 19 U.S.C. § 2438 (1976).
1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 7-10, 22-23.
Id. at 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 22.
S. 2721 (as amended), 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. S5470 (daily ed. May 15,
1980); see also 126 CONG. REC. S6926 (daily ed. June 13, 1980); H.R. 7338, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., 126 CONG. REc. H3602 (daily ed. May 13, 1980).
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Congressional hearings on the proposal occurred in August and
September 1980.88 The State Department conceded that Czechoslovakia
had violated international law by expropriating property without pro-
viding adequate compensation. However, the Department opposed the
legislative proposal on several grounds, including that (1) the gold could
not be considered Czech property, and hence subject to seizure by the
United States under accepted principles of law, until its final allocation
and delivery to Czecholovakia; (2) unilateral action by the United States
regarding the gold in its custody would violate the Tripartite Commis-
sion Arrangement's requirement that decisions of the Commission be
unanimous; and (3) the international legal doctrine of reprisal forbade
United States action in this case, because the Uied States could not
yet demonstrate that reasonable efforts at negotiation had failed. 9
The State Department's arguments that title to the gold had not
passed to Czechoslovakia when the Tripartite Commission had finally
adjudicated Czechoslovakia's rights-indeed when France had transfer-
red six tons of gold to Czechoslovakia pursuant to that decision-was un-
convincing. In 1974, State Department representatives had asserted
that "[t]his is gold to which the Czechs have a legal title, which has never
been questioned."4 The second contention, that the British and French
governments would object to the United States' failure to secure their
consent before acting, was more serious, but the State Department con-
ceded in testimony that unilateral action would not be seriously
detrimental to United States relations with either country;4' and, of
course, the United States retained the option to negotiate with the
British and French for their approval, if the Czechoslovak stalemate per-
sisted, as Senate Committee members had suggested in 1974." The State
Department's third argument, that one could not consider these negotia-
tions a failure after thirty-three years, seemed curious indeed.
When the Ninety-seventh Congress convened in 1981, Senator
Moynihan and Representative Bingham introduced similar versions of
the legislation considered in 1980."3 Meanwhile, a particularly able State
Department delegation, led by former Counselor to the Department
' See 1980 House Claims Hearing and 1980 Senate Claims Hearing, supra note 14.
' See 1980 House Claims Hearing, supra note 14, at 28 (Legal Opinion of Department
of State and Department of Treasury).
4 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 1; see also id. at 22.
" 1980 House Claims Hearing, supra note 14, at 55-56. The State Department
representative testified that "[olur main argument is not based upon the' adverse conse-
quences of this legislation. Our main argument is based on the idea that we ought to be
given a fair chance to pursue the negotiating route." Id. at 56. He testified further that the
legislative proposal had accelerated the negotiating process and that it would become clear
within a few months whether a concrete result was attainable. Id. at 26.
"' 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 7.
" 8.754 (as amended), 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S2413 (daily ed. March 19,
1981); H.R. 2631, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H1035 (daily ed. March 19, 1981); see
also 127 CONG. REc. E1162 (daily ed. March 18, 1981).
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Rozanne Ridgway, began a series of negotiations in Prague. At this point
congressional intervention in the negotiating process began to have a
dispositive effect. Here were the elements of the situation which led, in
November 1981, to the conclusion of the highest claims recovery in re-
cent American history.
Ambassador Ridgway, instead of conveying the Department's sym-
pathy to the Czechoslovaks over Congress' proposed "unlawful" legisla-
tion, simply advised that the measure would pass and the United States
would seize the Czech gold unless Czechoslovakia made a reasonable
proposal to settle the American claims. To give credence to her asser-
tion, the Senate Finance Committee unanimously reported the Moynihan
legislation." For jurisdictional reasons, the bill was then referred to the
Foreign Relations Committee. That Committee, which might have been
thought to be especially sympathetic to concerns of legal legitimacy-if
no longer particularly committed to detente with Eastern European
Communist states-simply reported the bill to the Senate without com-
ment. There it sat, ready for easy passage if the Prague negotiations
stalled.
Czechoslovakia repeated its original offer of $20,000,000. Am-
bassador Ridgway quickly refused it. Then followed a series of steadily
larger offers, each of them declined on the ground that congressional ap-
proval, required by the 1974 Trade Act, would not be forthcoming for
anything less than a fair settlement of these thirty-three-year-old claims.
The injustice suffered by the mostly elderly claimants whose prop-
erty Czechoslovakia had taken in 1948, who held awards with interest
only through 1958, and who had received no benefit from the apprecia-
tion of property values in the intervening decades, was a powerful spur
towards a full recovery. Even members of Congress without constitu-
tent claimants could appreciate this injustice, and thus there was no
counter-pressure within Congress to accept a low settlement. Further-
more, two elements which had led the United States to accept from
other countries less than a full settlement of its citizens' claims-the
lack of assets that the United States might seize, if necessary, to
generate a substantial claims fund; and geopolitical considerations that
suggested getting the claims issues out of the way~in order to pursue
larger goals-were both missing in the case of Czechoslovakia. A spec-
tacular rise in the price of gold provided substantial leverage, and the
U.S. had little to gain from placating the Czechs through a generous com-
promise.
There was still another congressional motive in seeking a high
" S. REP. No. 189, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Two House subcommittees had
favorably reported a similar bill (H.R. 2631) to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on
June 24, 1981. See 1981 House Claims Hearings, supra note 19, at 14. Thus, the House of
Representatives, which customarily has a more limited role than the Senate in foreign
policy matters, was poised to share in a congressional solution to this intractable foreign
dispute.
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percentage recovery. American property-owners abroad had suffered a
series of expropriations over the years, with little or no compensation.
This annoying phenomenon brought about the blocking of the
$20,000,000 settlement in 1974; now, with the gold's value providing
more than adequate collateral for fair compensation, Congress was
determined that this opportunity to establish a useful precedent not be
lost.
Finally, the alternative to a negotiated settlement that the United
States threatened to employ, while unusual, was neither unjust to the
other nation nor unlawful.45 The legislative proposal provided for a final
attempt at negotiation and, absent a settlement, would have returned to
Czechoslovakia the full value of its gold as of the date of taking, after the
proceeds had generated enough earnings to compensate the award-
holders. Seizure of the gold would have annoyed the Czechs and required
consultation with Britain and France, but in the light of Czech intran-
sigence over the years, it would have been widely regarded as merited.
Yet even the sponsors of the legislation wished for a negotiated set-
tlement, and willingly gave Ambassador Ridgway and the Czechs time
to reach one before passing it. The United States and Czechoslovak
Governments obviated the need for enactment of the legislation by
reaching an acceptable agreement on November 6, 1981."6 The agree-
ment provided for the payment of $81,500,000 in full settlement of all
claims, and for the release of the gold to Czechoslovakia. The $81,500,000
represented full payment of the principal still owing - about $65,000,000-
plus twenty-two percent of the interest through 1958. On December 16,
1981, Congress approved the Agreement, as the Trade Act of 1974 re-
quired, in the Czechoslovakian Claims Settlement Act of 1981."7
We do not suggest that the Czech claims affair offers a paradigm for
all, or even for many disputes in which the United States may become
engaged. We do suggest that an attitude of cooperation between the ex-
ecutive and congressional branches of government can be fruitful to
both, and to American interests abroad. Congressional pressure, based
on considerations of justice, served to give the executive negotiators a
lever by which the weight of thirty years' intransigence on the part of
the Czechs could be moved. The negotiators, in turn, kept Congress and
the claimants fully advised of the progress of their discussions. The trust
and common purpose that resulted brought about a recovery four times
greater than the awardholders would have received, had not Congress
stepped in to block the proposed settlement of 1974. In our view, the
writers of the Federalist Papers, and even the Curtiss-Wright Court,
would have approved the process.
" See 1980 Senate Claims Hearing, supra note 14, at 52 (Legal Appendix to the State-
ment by Harry McPherson).
" Agreement on the Settlement of Certain Outstanding Claims and Financial Issues,
Nov. 6, 1981, United States-Czechoslovakia, 21 I.L.M. 371.
22 U.S.C. § 1642 (Supp. V 1981).
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